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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
NATRONE WARD SEARS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 





THE STATE OF UTAH, 




Case No. 14669 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from an adverse decision by the lower 
Court where the lower Court granted third party defendant and 
respondent's Motion to Dismiss, same having been filed on the 
24th day of February, 1976, and having been decided by the 
Honorable Ronald 0. Hyde, District Court Judge of the District 
Court of Weber County, State of Utah, same having been decided 
by Memorandum Decision on the 21st day of May, 1976, and by Order 
Dismissing Third Party Complaint of Dwain Thomas Southworth 
against the State of Utah, Department of Highways, signed on 
the 1st day of June, 1976. Third party plaintiff, Dwain Thomas 
Southworth, and appellant herein, was party to a suit filed by 
Natrone Ward Sears, plaintiff in lower Court, against the 
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aforementioned third party plaintiff and appellant herein, 
same having been filed by plaintiff in the lower Court on or 
about the 8th day of November, 1974, against defendant and 
third party plaintiff, appellant herein, seeking recovery for 
personal injuries suffered by her resulting from a motor 
vehicle accident. Subsequent to the filing of the original 
Complaint herein by plaintiff in the lower Court, third party 
plaintiff and appellant herein, did file his Amended Third 
Party Complaint against the State of Utah, Department of 
Highways, third party defendant and respondent herein, 
claiming negligence on the part of the State of Utah, 
Department of Highways, and seeking recovery for personal 
injuries suffered by him as a result of the motor vehicle 
accident herein. Prior to trial on the merits, third party 
defendant-respondent did file their Motion to Dismiss the 
Second Cause of Action of third party plaintiff-appellant's 
Amended Third Party Complaint on the ground .that appellant 
failed to comply with the Utah Governmental Immunity Act 
regarding notice to the State of Utah. 
The basis for their Motion to Dismiss, was that the 
original accident herein occurred on the 10th day of May, 1973, 
and that Notice of Claim by third party plaintiff-appellant 
against the State of Utah.was not filed until the 5th day of 
April, 1975. i 
On or about the 24th day of February, 1976, third party 
defendant-respondent did file their Motion to Dismiss third 
party plaintiff-appellant's action herein, and supported same 
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with a Memorandum of Points and Authorities. On or about the 
26th day of March, 1976, third party plaintiff-appellant did 
respond by filing his Memorandum of Points and Authorities in 
opposition to third party defendant's Motion to Dismiss. Third 
party defendant-respondent then filed their Reply Memorandum 
and both parties allowed the lower Court to decide the questions 
submitted pursuant to Rule 2.8, Rules of Practice of the District 
Courts of the State of Utah without further oral argument. 
Third party defendant-respondent's Motion to Dismiss was 
granted by the lower Court on the 21st day of May, 1976, and 
this appeal is based on that decision, 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Third party defendant-respondent's Motion to Dismiss third 
party plaintiff-appellant's action brought against it was granted 
by the lower Court based upon the fact that Notice of Claim 
against the State of Utah was filed over one year from the 
date that the accident complained of occurred claiming that the 
State of Utah did not receive sufficient and adequate notice 
within the one year provision as set forth in the Governmental 
Immunity Aet, Utah Code Annotated, Chapter 30, Section 63 thereof. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of the lower Court's granting of 
third party defendant-respondent's Motion to Dismiss, and that 
this Court issue an Order to the lower Court ordering it to 
accept third party plaintiff-appellant's Amended Complaint 
against third party defendant-respondent for the reason that 
the Notice of Claim requirement as a prerequisite to maintaining 
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an action against the State of Utah for negligence does create 
a special statute of limitations for Governmental Tort Feasors 
and as such is violative of the equal protection guarantees of 
the Constitution of the United States and of the Constitution 
of the State of Utah. 
That in the event this Honorable Court does not believe 
that the Notice of Claim requirement creates a special statute 
of limitations as hereinabove requested, that then in that event 
this Honorable Court Order the lower Court to accept third party 
plaintiff-appellant's Amended Complaint in that the Notice of 
Claim requirement does not apply when a claim against the State 
for negligence in the exercise of a proprietary function is 
presented. V % > 
That in the event neither of the above is granted by this 
Honorable Court, that then in that event this Honorable Court 
Order the lower Court to accept the Amended Complaint of third 
party plaintiff-appellant to allow third party plaintiff-appellant 
to present sufficient evidence to indicate that no knowledge of 
the negligence of the State of Utah was discovered until the 
time set for taking Depositions and not until approximately 
March 7, 1975. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
This matter was commenced in the lower Court, by the filing 
of a Complaint in the District Court of Weber County, State of 
Utah, by plaintiff herein, Natrone Ward Sears, said Complaint 
having been filed on or about the 11th day of November, 1974, 
against defendant third party plaintiff and appellant herein, 
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Dwain Thomas Southworth, seeking recovery for injuries suffered 
by the aforesaid plaintiff, as a result of an automobile collision 
which occurred on Interstate 15 near Sunset, Davis County, Utah, 
on or about the 10th day of May, 1973. 
An Answer was filed by defendant, Dwain Thomas Southworth, 
on or about the 2nd day of December, 1974. Thereupon, defendant 
obtained the services of additional counsel, and on or about the 
24th day of December, 1974, did file an Amended Answer and Counter-
claim. In said Counterclaim damages were sought for personal 
injuries suffered as a result of the automobile accident which 
occurred on or about the 10th day of May, 1973, as above referred 
to. On or about the 2nd day of January, 1975, original counsel 
for defendant and then counterclaimant, Dwain Thomas Southworth, 
filed a Notice of Claim against the State of Utah, Department of 
Highways and to the Attorney General of the State of Utah, basically 
seeking contribution from the State of Utah, Department of 
Highways proportionate to its degree of negligence claimed in 
said notice to be failure to adequately place warning signs or 
other devices prior to the point where the inside lane of travel 
on said highway had been obstructed by the placing of conical 
warning signs blocking said lane of highway. That thereupon, 
on or about the 21st day of February, 1975, a Third Party 
Complaint was filed by defendant and third party plaintiff, 
appellant herein, against the State of Utah, Department of 
Highways, primarily seeking payment by the State of Utah, 
Department of Highways for any Judgment which plaintiff herein 
would obtain for injuries and damages against defendant and 
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third party plaintiff, . 
Thereafter, on or about the 5th day of April, 1975, Dwain 
Thomas Southworth did file his notice to the State of Utah 
directing same to the Attorney General of the State of Utah 
and to the State of Utah Road Commission, claiming damages 
suffered by him as a result of the negligence of the State of 
Utah, and the State of Utah Road Commission, in failure to 
adequately provide warning of an obstruction which was present 
on the road hereinabove referred to and claiming that said 
failure to warn resulted in the accident herein. 
Thereafter, defendant and third party plaintiff, appellant 
herein, filed his Motion to Amend the Third Party Complaint 
herein, same having been filed on the 29th day of December, 1975. 
Said Motion to Amend Third Party Complaint was opposed by third 
party defendant, respondent herein, and memoranda by both third 
party plaintiff and third party defendant were filed supporting 
their respective contentions. Argument was had thereon before 
the District Court of the Second Judicial District in and for 
the County of Weber, State of Utah, the Honorable Judge Calvin 
Gould presiding, on the 11th day of February, 1976, whereupon 
the Court took the Motion to Amend his Third Party Complaint 
under advisement. A Memorandum Decision was rendered by the 
Honorable Calvin Gould on the 17th day of February, 1976, 
granting third party plaintiff's Motion to Amend Third Party 
Complaint. Thereafter, on or about the 20th day of February, 
1976, defendant-third party plaintiff-appellant filed his Amended 
Third Party Complaint against third party defendant-respondent. 
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Third party defendant-respondent filed its Motion to Dismiss on 
or about the 24th day of February, 1976, with supporting Memorandum 
of Points and Authorities thereon. Defendant third party plaintiff 
and appellant herein filed his Memorandum of Points and Authorities 
in opposition to third party defendant's Motion to Dismiss on 
or about the 26th day of March, 1976, whereupon a Reply Memorandum 
was filed by third party defendant and respondent herein on or 
about the 30th day of March, 1976. Lower Court, the Honorable 
Judge Ronald 0. Hyde granted third party defendant's Motion to 
Dismiss, finding the case of Gallegos v. Midvale City, 27 Utah 2nd 
27, 492 P 2nd 1335 (1972) as controlling of the question. Defendant, 
third party plaintiff-appellant filed his Notice of Appeal on the 
28th day of June, 1976, said Appeal being filed before this Honorable 
Court on the 10th day of August, 1976. 
Appellant herein intends to rely primarily on the record 
before this Court and on the extensive memoranda submitted by 
both sides in the lower Court. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE MAINTENANCE OF PUBLIC HIGHWAYS IS A PROPRIETARY 














OUTSIDE THE SCOPE 
AND THE NOTICE 
OF 
OF 
REQUIREMENTS THEREIN ARE INAPPLICABLE. 
The Court is referred to the Memorandum of Points and 
Authorities in opposition to third party defendant's Motion to 
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Dismiss which was filed with the lower Court by defendant and 
third party plaintiff, appellant herein. 
The State herein undertook a proprietary function by its 
undertaking the maintenance of public highways herein and the 
painting thereof. At the time that the accident complained of 
in this action occurred, the State of Utah was in the process 
of painting lines upon the highway in the vicinity of the 
accident site, and in doing so failed to take adequate 
precautionary measures to insure that an accident of this 
nature would not occur. Idaho, our neighboring State, in a 19 
decision, held that the Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity was 
inapplicable where a unit of government acts in a proprietary 
function. The Idaho Supreme Court further held that the 
construction and maintenance of highways is a proprietary 
function, which is the case before the Bar here. See Smith v. 
State, 93 Idaho 795, 473 P 2nd 937 (1970). 
It is contended by appellant herein that the rationale 
followed in Smith should be followed by this Honorable Court 
where the Court stated at 473 P 2nd 937, page 946 thereof, as 
follows: -
"We therefore hold that the Highway 
Department is subject to liability 
for harm caused to persons lawfully 
using the highways for the purposes 
intended when the State Highway 
Department creates or maintains a 
dangerous condition on the highway 
if the State Highway Department: 
(1) Knows of or by the exercise of 
reasonable care would discover such 
condition, (2) should realize that 
the condition involved an unreasonable 
risk of harm to those using the highways, 
and (3) should expect that persons using 
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the highway will not discover or 
realize the danger, and (4) fails 
to exercise reasonable care to make 
the condition safe or to adequately 
warn of the condition and the risk 
involved, and (5) the persons using 
the highways do not know or have 
reason to know of the condition and 
attendant risks.ft cf
 # , 2 Restatement 
of Torts, Sections 342, 343, and 343A. 
Along the same lines the Court has referred to Prosser, Law 
of Torts, 3rd Ed. Chapter 27, Section 125. 
POINT II. 
THE RIGHT TO BRING AN ACTION FOR DAMAGES AGAINST 
A TORT FEASOR IS A RIGHT VESTED IN THE VICTIM AND 
CANNOT BE DENIED NOR ENCUMBERED BY THE STATE 
ABSENT A REASONABLE BASIS FOR THAT ACTION. 
THEREFORE, THAT PART OF THE UTAH GOVERNMENTAL 
IMMUNITY ACT WHICH REQUIRES TIMELY NOTICE"PRIOR 
TO THE FILING OF A CLAIM UNDER THE ACT IS VOID 
AND OF NO EFFECT AS VIOLATIVE OF THE EQUAL 
PROTECTION GUARANTEES OF THE STATE AND FEDERAL 
CONSTITUTIONS. 
The lower Court in granting third party defendant's Motion 
to Dismiss, primarily relied on the case of Gallegos v. Midvale 
City, 27 Utah 2nd 27, 492 P 2d 1335 (1972). Although that case 
primarily dealt with the question whether or not a minor was 
subject to the notice requirement pursuant to the Waiver of 
Sovereign Immunity involving cities, the Honorable Justice 
Ellett in his dissenting opinion starting at page 1338 of 492 
P 2nd presented a far more convincing argument recognizing the 
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problem with the equal protection guarantees of the Constitution 
of the United States and the Constitution of the State of Utah. 
There is no question, that the Governmental Immunity Act 
requiring notice to the government of injuries sustained as a 
result of the negligence of governmental agencies, sets up four 
separate types of classes, those being governmental tort feasors, 
private tort feasors, victims of governmental tort feasors, and 
victims of private tort feasors. For an extensive review and 
discussion of the background.and problems inherent in the notice 
requirement provisions in Waivers of Governmental Immunity Acts, 
see 60 Cornell Law Review 417, a copy of which was attached to 
third party plaintiff and appellant's Memorandum of Points and 
Authorities in opposition to third party defendant's Motion to 
Dismiss, submitted to the lower Court herein. 
There is no question that the traditional policies that the 
King can do no wrong have been changed, and realistically should 
have been changed. In American society, government does not 
emanate from a superior being, but rather emanates directly from 
the people, and as such, government is nothing more than a body 
of the people. As such, the old adage of the King can do no 
wrong is an outmoded and outdated concept, which was recognized 
by the Legislature of the State of Utah when they passed into 
law Chapter 30, Section 63 of the Utah Code Annotated, generally 
referred to as the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. However, when 
the Legislature required the various notice requirements, Section 
63-30-12, Utah Code Annotated, it placed a severe burden upon 
injured parties suffered as a result of governmental torts, and 
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placed the governmental entities in a much more favored class 
than private tort feasors. 
The Court's attention is drawn to the extensive arguments 
set forth in third party plaintiff-appellant's Memorandum of 
Points and Authorities in opposition to third party defendant's 
Motion to Dismiss, having been submitted to lower Court, and 
appellant herein is not going to reiterate the arguments contained 
therein, however, is going to rely upon the extensive law presented 
heretofore and which has been made a part of the record herein. 
The Court is further referred to the article contained in 
1975 Utah Law Review 1027, and starting at page 1043 thereof. 
POINT III. 
THE STATE OF UTAH DID RECEIVE ADEQUATE NOTICE OF 
THE ACCIDENT INVOLVED, AND WERE AWARE OR SHOULD 
HAVE BEEN AWARE OF THE NEGLIGENCE INVOLVED. 
Even if we accept the State1s contention that no notice was 
provided to it pursuant to the Governmental Immunity Act, there 
is no way that the State can deny that they were aware of the 
accident herein, since the accident herein was investigated by 
its law enforcement officers and a written investigating officer's 
report of traffic accident was filed with the State as required. 
Said report was filed on or about the 25th day of May, 1973, 
bearing number 46489. The State of Utah, by and through its 
agents, were aware or should have been aware of the painting 
operation which had occurred, in that the report specifically 
set forth the driver of vehicle number two was slowing down for 
State Road paint crews on 1-15. The lane was marked with rubber 
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cones. Some cones were placed diagonally across the inside 
traffic lane.... It is further interesting to note that the 
official report filed by the investigating officer and his 
field note report indicate a different location of the warning 
sign warning of the painting which was being conducted. The 
field note report indicating that the warning sign was placed 
behind the conical warning markers, and the official report 
filed with the State indicating that the warning sign was 
placed somewhat ahead of the conical warning markers. 
At any rate, if this Honorable Court finds that the one 
year notice requirement set forth in the Governmental Immunity 
Act is valid, then appellant should still be allowed to proceed 
on the basis of the dissent by the Honorable Justice Maughan 
in the case of Scarborough v. Granite School District, 531 P 2d 
480, (1975), in that the notice requirement and the justifications 
for said requirement were satisfied by the filing of an accident 
report filed by the investigating officer of said accident. 
Further, the one year notice requirement if same is found to be 
constitutional and valid, should not begin to run until discovery 
of the negligence of the State of Utah was made, which said 
discovery of negligence was not made until approximately the 
7th day of March, 1975. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The painting of a highway by the State of Utah was a 
proprietary function of government, and as such, is not within 
the scope of the Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity, and as such, 
does not require that the notice provision of the Governmental 
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Immunity Act be complied with. 
The requirement of the giving of a notice prioi «o a filing 
of suit, and said notice being shorter than the statute of 
limitations for tortious conduct of private tort feasors, creates 
special legislation in favoir of governmental entities, and 
creates four separate classes of individuals affected by tortious 
conduct, with governmental entities being given preferred status, 
and as si ich, is a violation of the equal protection clauses of 
the Constitution of the State of Utah as well -s tic Constitution 
of the United States of America. As such, thr- -.a, ;( c. .-. qiilrement 
of the Governmental Immunity Act should be declared as invalid 
and unconstitutional and of no force and effect. 
The fae 1. Mia I a w i :I t ten investigating officerf s report o i." 
traffic accident was filed with the State of Utah shoiild have 
given the State of Utah adequate and sufficient notice of the 
possible action or claim against :i t where the report refers to 
the actions of the State Road paint crew and indicates that the 
site of the accident was at the same place where the c« a( c Rc-d 
paint crew placed conical warning markers across one lane <)f 
traffic. As such, if the notice requirement provision is upheld 
by thi s Honorab 1 e Court, th 1 s Coi n :t shon] d f :i nd that i 101ice was 
given to the State of Utah, and that the underlying theories for 
the giving of notice was substantially complied with. 
Further, this Court should rule
 Lht-L L:JG running of the one 
year notice requirement does not take effect until such time 
that an injured party discovers the negligence of the governmental 
entity involved. 
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Respectfully submitted this 8th day of October, 1976. 
lAVAS & LEMA 
)avid B. Havas 
Attorneys for Third Party 
Plaintiff Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
Mailed a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing 
Appeal to attorney for third party defendant and respondent, 
Kim R. Wilson, Seventh Floor Continental Bank Building, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84101, postage prepaid, on this 8th day of 
October, 1976. 
(L'^^j^^yLuoLf 
LINDA MOORE, Secretary 
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